Difference between revisions of "Plausible deniability"

Jump to navigation Jump to search
no edit summary
(Created page with "{{multiple issues|{{globalize|article|the United States|date=May 2015}} {{more citations needed|date=May 2015}} {{Lead too long|date=May 2017}}}} '''Plausible deniability'''...")
 
Line 3: Line 3:
{{Lead too long|date=May 2017}}}}
{{Lead too long|date=May 2017}}}}


'''Plausible deniability''' is the ability of people (typically senior officials in a formal or informal [[chain of command]]) to [[denial|deny]] knowledge of or responsibility for any damnable actions committed by others in an organizational hierarchy because of a lack of evidence that can confirm their participation, even if they were personally involved in or at least [[willful blindness|willfully ignorant]] of the actions. In the case that illegal or otherwise disreputable and unpopular activities become public, high-ranking officials may deny any awareness of such acts to insulate themselves and [[Blame#Blame shifting|shift blame]] onto the agents who carried out the acts, as they are confident that their doubters will be unable to prove otherwise. The lack of evidence to the contrary ostensibly makes the denial plausible, that is, credible, although sometimes it merely makes it [[cause of action|unactionable]]. The term typically implies forethought, such as intentionally setting up the conditions to plausibly avoid responsibility for one's (future) actions or knowledge. In some organizations, legal doctrines such as [[command responsibility]] exist to hold major parties responsible for the actions of subordinates involved in heinous acts and nullify any legal protection that their denial of involvement would carry.
'''Plausible deniability''' is the ability of people (typically senior officials in a formal or informal [[chain of command]]) to [[denial|deny]] knowledge of or responsibility for any damnable actions committed by others in an organizational hierarchy because of a lack of evidence that can confirm their participation, even if they were personally involved in or at least [[willful blindness|willfully ignorant]] of the actions. In the case that illegal or otherwise disreputable and unpopular activities become public, high-ranking officials may deny any awareness of such acts to insulate themselves and [[Blame#Blame shifting|shift blame]] onto the agents who carried out the acts, as they are confident that their doubters will be unable to prove otherwise. The lack of evidence to the contrary ostensibly makes the denial plausible (that is, credible), although sometimes it merely makes it [[cause of action|unactionable]]. The term typically implies forethought, such as intentionally setting up the conditions to plausibly avoid responsibility for one's (future) actions or knowledge. In some organizations, legal doctrines such as [[command responsibility]] exist to hold major parties responsible for the actions of subordinates involved in heinous acts and nullify any legal protection that their denial of involvement would carry.
 
High-ranking officials in more typically Eastern cultures, such as Japan or Korea, are often expected to take full responsibility for improper actions by their subordinates. As an example, Japanese CEOs have made dramatic public apologies and even committed suicide when their companies have been dishonored in some way.''[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/728976.stm],''


In [[politics]] and [[espionage]], deniability refers to the ability of a powerful player or intelligence agency to [[buck passing|pass the buck]] and avoid [[blowback (intelligence)|blowback]] by secretly arranging for an action to be taken on their behalf by a third party ostensibly unconnected with the major player. In political campaigns, plausible deniability enables candidates to stay clean and denounce third-party advertisements that use unethical approaches or potentially libellous innuendo.
In [[politics]] and [[espionage]], deniability refers to the ability of a powerful player or intelligence agency to [[buck passing|pass the buck]] and avoid [[blowback (intelligence)|blowback]] by secretly arranging for an action to be taken on their behalf by a third party ostensibly unconnected with the major player. In political campaigns, plausible deniability enables candidates to stay clean and denounce third-party advertisements that use unethical approaches or potentially libellous innuendo.


In the US, plausible deniability is also a legal concept.  It refers to lack of evidence proving an allegation.  Standards of proof vary in civil and criminal cases.  In civil cases, the standard of proof is "preponderance of the evidence" whereas in a criminal matter, the standard is "beyond a reasonable doubt".  If an opponent cannot provide evidence for his allegation, one can plausibly deny the allegation even though it may be true.
In the US, plausible deniability is also a legal concept.  It refers to lack of evidence proving an allegation.  Standards of proof vary in civil and criminal cases.  In civil cases, the standard of proof is "preponderance of the evidence" whereas in a criminal matter, the standard is [[reasonable doubt|"beyond a reasonable doubt"]].  If an opponent cannot provide evidence for his allegation, one can plausibly deny the allegation even though it may be true.


Although plausible deniability has existed throughout history, that name for it was coined by the [[CIA]] in the early 1960s to describe the withholding of information from senior officials in order to protect them from repercussions in the event that illegal or unpopular activities by the CIA became public knowledge. The roots of the name go back to Harry Truman's national security council paper 10/2 of June 18, 1948, which defined "covert operations" as "...all activities (except as noted herein) which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them."<ref>Office of the Historian, Department of State. ''[https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d292 National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects (NSC 10/2)],'' Washington, June 18, 1948.</ref> During [[Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower's administration]], NSC 10/2 was incorporated into more specific NSC 5412/2 "Covert Operations."<ref>Office of the Historian, Department of State. ''[https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d250 Covert Operations (NSC 5412/2)],'' Washington, undated.</ref> NSC 5412 was de-classified in 1977, and is located at the National Archives.<ref>''[https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/273.html Records of the National Security Council (NSC), Record Group 273.]''</ref>
Although plausible deniability has existed throughout history, that name for it was coined by the [[CIA]] in the early 1960s to describe the withholding of information from senior officials in order to protect them from repercussions in the event that illegal or unpopular activities by the CIA became public knowledge. The roots of the name go back to Harry Truman's [[United States National Security Council]] paper 10/2 of June 18, 1948, which defined "covert operations" as "...all activities (except as noted herein) which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them."<ref>Office of the Historian, Department of State. ''[https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d292 National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects (NSC 10/2)],'' Washington, June 18, 1948.</ref> During [[Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower's administration]], NSC 10/2 was incorporated into more specific NSC 5412/2 "Covert Operations."<ref>Office of the Historian, Department of State. ''[https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d250 Covert Operations (NSC 5412/2)],'' Washington, undated.</ref> NSC 5412 was de-classified in 1977, and is located at the National Archives.<ref>''[https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/273.html Records of the National Security Council (NSC), Record Group 273.]''</ref>


==Overview==
==Overview==
Line 33: Line 31:
| year =1864
| year =1864
| title =Passages from the Life of a Philosopher
| title =Passages from the Life of a Philosopher
| url =https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_Fa1JAAAAMAAJ
| publisher =Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, & Green
| publisher =Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, & Green
}} p. 261-262</ref>
}} p. 261-262</ref>
Line 55: Line 54:
===Iran–Contra affair===
===Iran–Contra affair===


In his testimony to the congressional committee studying the [[Iran–Contra affair]], Vice Admiral [[John Poindexter]] stated: "I made a deliberate decision not to ask the President, so that I could insulate him from the decision and provide some future deniability for the President if it ever leaked out."<ref>{{cite book
In his testimony to the congressional committee studying the [[Iran–Contra affair]], Vice Admiral [[John Poindexter]] stated: "I made a deliberate decision not to ask the President, so that I could insulate him from the decision and provide some future deniability for the President if it ever leaked out."<ref>{{cite book  
| last =Jamieson  
| last =Jamieson  
| first =Kathleen Hall  
| first =Kathleen Hall  
| authorlink =
| authorlink =  
| year =1993
| year =1993  
| title =Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy
| title =Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy  
| publisher =Oxford University Press US
| publisher =Oxford University Press US  
| location =
| location =  
| isbn =0-19-508553-1  
| isbn =0-19-508553-1  
| url-access =registration
| url =https://archive.org/details/dirtypoliticsdec00jami
}}p. 86</ref>
}}p. 86</ref>


===Declassified government documents===
===Declassified government documents===
*[http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/doc148.htm Pentagon papers October 25, 1963] Telegram from the Ambassador in Vietnam [[Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.]] to Special Assistant for National Security Affairs [[McGeorge Bundy]] on US Options with Respect to a Possible Coup, mentioning the term plausible denial [https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iv/12652.htm Alternative link (See Telegram 216)]
*[http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/doc148.htm Pentagon papers October 25, 1963] Telegram from the Ambassador in Vietnam [[Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.]] to Special Assistant for National Security Affairs [[McGeorge Bundy]] on US Options with Respect to a Possible Coup, mentioning the term plausible denial [https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iv/12652.htm Alternative link (See Telegram 216)]
*CIA and White House documents on covert political intervention in the 1964 Chilean election declassified.  The CIA's Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, J.C. King, recommended that funds for the campaign "be provided in a fashion causing ([[Eduardo Frei Montalva]] president of Chile) to infer United States origin of funds and yet permitting plausible denial"<ref name = "national2">{{cite web
*CIA and White House documents on covert political intervention in the 1964 Chilean election declassified.  The CIA's Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, J.C. King, recommended that funds for the campaign "be provided in a fashion causing ([[Eduardo Frei Montalva]] president of Chile) to infer United States origin of funds and yet permitting plausible denial"<ref name = "national2">{{cite web
| title =Chile 1964: CIA covert support in Frei election detailed; operational and policy records released for first time
| title =Chile 1964: CIA covert support in Frei election detailed; operational and policy records released for first time
Line 90: Line 91:
* "Plausible denial" only increases the risk of misunderstanding between senior officials and their employees.<ref>[[Church Committee]] IV. Section C Subsection 5  Page 277:
* "Plausible denial" only increases the risk of misunderstanding between senior officials and their employees.<ref>[[Church Committee]] IV. Section C Subsection 5  Page 277:
::''"Plausible denial" increases the risk of misunderstanding. Subordinate officials should describe their proposals in clear, precise, and brutally frank language; superiors are entitled to, and should demand, no less''</ref>
::''"Plausible denial" increases the risk of misunderstanding. Subordinate officials should describe their proposals in clear, precise, and brutally frank language; superiors are entitled to, and should demand, no less''</ref>
* If the claim fails, it seriously discredits the political figure invoking it as a defense. ("It's not the crime, it's the cover-up"){{citation needed|date=May 2017}}
* If the claim fails, it seriously discredits the political figure invoking it as a defense. ("It's not the crime, it's the [[cover-up]]"){{citation needed|date=May 2017}}
* If it succeeds, it creates the impression that the government is not in control of the state.{{citation needed|date=May 2017}}
* If it succeeds, it creates the impression that the government is not in control of the state. ("Asleep at the switch"){{citation needed|date=May 2017}}


==Other examples==
==Other examples==
Line 149: Line 150:
* {{ cite book | last = Shulsky | first = Abram N | authorlink = |author2=Gary James Schmitt  | year = 2002 | title = Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence | publisher = | location = | isbn = 1-57488-345-3 | pages = 93–94, 130–132 }}
* {{ cite book | last = Shulsky | first = Abram N | authorlink = |author2=Gary James Schmitt  | year = 2002 | title = Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence | publisher = | location = | isbn = 1-57488-345-3 | pages = 93–94, 130–132 }}
* {{ cite book | last = Treverton | first = Gregory F. | authorlink = | year = 1988 | title = Covert Action: The CIA and the Limits of American Intervention in the Postwar World | publisher = Palgrave Macmillan | location = | isbn = 1-85043-089-6 }}
* {{ cite book | last = Treverton | first = Gregory F. | authorlink = | year = 1988 | title = Covert Action: The CIA and the Limits of American Intervention in the Postwar World | publisher = Palgrave Macmillan | location = | isbn = 1-85043-089-6 }}
*Michael Poznansky (2020) "[https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2020.1734570 Revisiting plausible deniability]." Journal of Strategic Studies.


== External links ==
== External links ==
14

edits

Navigation menu